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Tobacco Symposium
The FDA's Decision to Regulate
Tobacco Products*
William B. Schultz,**
Deputy Commissioner for Policy,
Food and Drug Administration
Since the Surgeon General's Report of 1964, this country
has officially recognized that tobacco use is a serious health
problem.' The numbers themselves are staggering. Approxi-
mately fifty million Americans smoke cigarettes, 2 three million
of whom are children.3 Recent studies show that between sev-
enty-seven and ninety-two percent of smokers are addicted to
the nicotine in tobacco.4 Each year, more than 400,000 Ameri-
* This article is based on a speech given at Pace University School of Law in
April 1997.
** Mr. Schultz has been Deputy Commissioner of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration since February 1995. Between 1990 and 1994 he served as Counsel to the
House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment where he worked on the
Subcommittee's tobacco investigations. See Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part
1), 1994: Hearing Transcript, Subcomm. on Health and the Env't. of the Comm. on
Commerce, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., March 25, 1994, and April 14, 1994; Regula-
tion of Tobacco Products (Part 2), 1994: Hearing Transcript, Subcomm.on Health
and the Env't. of the Comm. on Commerce, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., April 28, 1994,
May 17, 1994, and May 26, 1994; and Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 3),
1994: Hearing Transcript, Subcomm. on Health and the Env't. of the Comm. on
Commerce, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., June 21, 1994, and June 23, 1994.
1. See generally Pub. Health Serv., U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., Welfare,
Smoking and Health, Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of
the Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Public Health Service, 1964.-
2. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44398 (1996).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 44812.
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cans die from tobacco related diseases;5 more than from AIDS,
car accidents, alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and
fires combined. 6
Tobacco use is not like an infectious disease where the cure
depends on developing a drug or vaccine. Instead, anyone can
eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, their risk of disease from
tobacco products simply by not smoking cigarettes or using
smokeless tobacco products.
Yet reducing tobacco use has been as great a challenge as
any public health problem this country has ever addressed. Un-
like other diseases, the challenge is not scientific; it is political.
For years, the tobacco companies had the votes on Capitol Hill
to block any proposed legislation, and no comprehensive tobacco
legislation was enacted.7
I worked on Capitol Hill during the early 1990s, which in-
cluded the first six months after the Food and Drug Administra-
tion announced its tobacco investigation. I then moved to the
FDA in November 1994, becoming Deputy Commissioner for
Policy, where my responsibilities included tobacco regulation.
In the early 1990s, I worked for the House Subcommittee
on Health and Environment, chaired by California Congress-
man Henry Waxman, a staunch tobacco opponent. During
those years, Congressman Waxman and others introduced leg-
islation to regulate the sale and promotion of tobacco products.
Hearings were held, but all attempts at comprehensive tobacco
legislation failed.
In February 1994, an agency that had not been actively in-
volved in the tobacco issue presented a new opportunity for to-
bacco regulation. In responding to a petition by a tobacco
control group, Dr. David Kessler, then Commissioner of Food
and Drugs, announced that the FDA would investigate whether
the nicotine in tobacco products was a drug that could be regu-
5. See id. at 44398.
6. See id.
7. However, the industry agreed to the enactment of several significant laws,
including the FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT, which requires
warning statements on cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982) et seq. See also COMPREHENSIVE SMOKELESS TOBACCO HEALTH EDU-
CATION ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 4401 (1986) et seq.
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lated by the FDA.8 That was an historic decision because it pro-
vided an opportunity for taking decisive action on tobacco
without requiring action by Congress. Regulations issued by
federal agencies have the force of law, yet do not have to be ap-
proved by Congress. If an administrative agency has jurisdic-
tion, it can issue regulations to implement that jurisdiction.
The significance of this letter was not lost on anyone who
was following the issue. Congressman Waxman immediately
scheduled hearings, which included dramatic testimony from
the chief executive officers of the tobacco companies. These ex-
ecutives raised their right hands, swore to tell the truth, and
then, one by one, denied that nicotine was addictive.
These hearings also included appearances by FDA Commis-
sioner Kessler.9 At the first hearing, Commissioner Kessler de-
scribed the results of the first stage of the FDA's investigation
into the tobacco industry; describing what the companies knew
and how they used that information to make cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products.
As Dr. Kessler explained, the first clue that the tobacco in-
dustry was highly focused on controlling nicotine levels came
from a search of the industry's patents. These patents revealed
that, beginning in the early 1960s, the tobacco companies con-
ducted extensive research on controlling the precise amount of
nicotine delivered by a cigarette. 10
Perhaps the most interesting of these patents was one con-
cerning the addition of an organic acid to tobacco to mask the
harsh flavor of nicotine. The stated purpose was to increase the
amount of nicotine in a cigarette through the use of high nico-
tine tobaccos, without creating an unacceptably harsh tasting
cigarette. These patents contradicted the industry's claim that
nicotine was used solely for its taste. Here was research being
conducted on how to increase nicotine levels, despite its taste.
However, the patents did not demonstrate that the companies
were actually controlling the nicotine levels in commercial prod-
8. Letter from David A. Kessler, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Food and
Drug Administration, to Scott Ballin, Chairman, Coalition on Smoking or Health
(February 25, 1994).
9. See Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 1), supra note *
10. See id.
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ucts. They only demonstrated that research had been
conducted.11
Some of the early evidence on the actual conduct of tobacco
companies came from the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC
is responsible for implementing the law requiring the warnings
that one sees on cigarette packages and advertising. 12 It also
collects, on a yearly basis, data on nicotine and tar levels of all
domestic cigarettes. During the 1970s and 80s, in response to
reports that "tar" was the troublesome ingredient in cigarettes,
the tobacco companies designed so-called "low tar" cigarettes.
Since both tar and nicotine are in tobacco smoke, nicotine levels
should have been reduced in an amount equivalent to the tar
reduction, which is what the companies always claimed hap-
pened. Yet, when the FDA analyzed the FTC data from the
1980s, it showed that the nicotine content for all marketed ciga-
rettes on a sales-weighted basis began to rise in 1982, while
sales-weighted tar levels continued to drop.' 3 This evidence
was very significant because it suggested that in fact the com-
panies were attempting to keep nicotine levels from being re-
duced below a certain level. 14
During the investigation, the FDA discovered that the in-
dustry could control the level of nicotine in cigarettes in a
number of ways. One method was blending leaves from differ-
ent positions on the stalks of tobacco plants.15 By blending dif-
ferent stalk positions from different tobacco varieties over
several crop years, the companies had literally dozens and doz-
ens of nicotine combinations from which to choose.
The agency found that one company went even further.
The FDA received a tip that the Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Company had created a new tobacco variety that contained
twice the usual amount of nicotine. The new tobacco was called
"Y-1." With luck and persistent digging, FDA investigators dis-
covered that the patent had been put to use.' 6
11. See Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 3), supra note **
12. See FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT, 15 U.S.C. 1331
(1982).
13. See Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 1), supra note **
14. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44369, 44916 (1996).
15. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41704-7 (1995); 61 Fed. Reg. 44982-3 (1996).
16. See Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 3), supra note **
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One of the three people named on the patent was a scientist
from a small genetic engineering firm in New Jersey. The sci-
entist told the agency that the New Jersey company had been
hired to genetically engineer the Y-1 plant so it would not pro-
duce pollen or seeds; therefore, it could not be stolen from the
field by competitors. She also said that she had shipped several
pounds of Y-1 seeds to Brazil, where Brown and Williamson had
patented the plant, and that she had actually seen Y-1 growing
in the fields.
The FDA sent an investigator to check U.S. Customs
records for evidence that Y-1 had been brought back into the
U.S. It was a long shot, but the investigator persisted and in-
formed the agency that he had found two invoices showing that
in September 1992, Brown and Williamson had shipped over
500,000 pounds of "your order project Y-1" into the U.S.17
When confronted with evidence about Y-1, Brown and Wil-
liamson executives acknowledged that they had as much as four
million pounds of this high nicotine tobacco, and that it had al-
ready been used commercially.' 8 More importantly, they admit-
ted that Y-1 was intended as a "blending tool" to lower the tar
yield in certain products, while maintaining the nicotine level,
although they said it was never used for that purpose.' 9
The agency also uncovered hundreds of studies conducted
by the tobacco companies - some public, some private - on
nicotine's effect on the brain and central nervous system. 20
They identified the specific receptors in the brain upon which
nicotine acts,2' and examined nicotine's effects on human be-
havior and mood.22 They measured how fast nicotine is ad-
sorbed into the bloodstream 23 and the brain, and how much
nicotine is necessary to "satisfy" smokers.24
One of the most interesting studies conducted by a tobacco
company was performed by Dr. Victor DeNoble, a research sci-
entist who ran a laboratory at Philip Morris between 1980 and
17. See id. at 19.
18. See id. at 20.
19. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44369, 44938 (1996).
20. See id. at 44854-44915.
21. See id. at 44896.
22. See id. at 44901.
23. See id. at 44906.
24. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44870 (1996).
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
1984. Phillip Morris was trying to create a safer cigarette that
would have the same effects on the brain as those with nicotine,
but would not have the unhealthy effects on the heart.25 In or-
der to develop this product, the company had to have a complete
understanding of nicotine's effects on the brain, including its
addictive qualities.26
In his work, Dr. DeNoble demonstrated for the first time
that rats will self-administer nicotine, one of the hallmarks of
addictive substances.27 The Journal Phopharmacology accepted
Dr. DeNoble's paper describing these findings for publication,
but Philip Morris subsequently forced DeNoble to withdraw the
manuscript. Years later, Philip Morris shut down Dr. De-
Noble's lab. 28 Dr. DeNoble agreed to testify before Congress,
and his testimony gave the FDA and Congress important evi-
dence that Philip Morris knew of nicotine's pharmacological
properties.
Even more impressive was the investigation's discovery of
internal tobacco industry documents that showed company offi-
cials knew nicotine was a powerful drug which had addictive
properties. 29 For example, according to the general counsel of
Brown and Williamson in 1963, "[wle are then, in the business
of selling nicotine, an addictive drug."3° A draft of remarks in
1969 by Philip Morris' Vice President for Research and Develop-
ment to the Board of Directors states, "[we are of the conviction
... that the ultimate explanation for the perpetuated cigaret[tel
habit resides in the pharmacological effect of smoke upon the
body of a smoker .... ,,31 In 1972, an R.J. Reynolds official
perceived the tobacco industry as "a specialized, highly ritual-
ized and stylized segment of the pharmaceutical industry."32
When that phase of the investigation was over, the FDA
had to decide whether nicotine products met the definition of a
drug under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 33. In or-
25. See id. at 44859.
26. See id. at 44860.
27. See id. at 44861.
28. Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 2), supra note **
29. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44369, 44854 (1996).
30. See id. at 44884.
31. See id. at 44856.
32. See id. at 44867.
33. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1972).
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der for the agency to find that nicotine is a drug, it had to deter-
mine that nicotine affects "the structure and function of the
human body," and that the tobacco manufacturers "intended"
that nicotine have this effect.34
It was clear from the evidence collected and numerous
studies that nicotine affects the structure and function of the
body. Every major medical organization, including the U.S.
Surgeon General, the American Medical Association, and the
World Health Organization has found that the scientific evi-
dence overwhelmingly shows that nicotine is addictive. 35 The
companies themselves had carefully documented the effects of
nicotine on the brain.36 That alone is enough to meet this
requirement. 37
On the issue of intent, it was also clear from the evidence,
the industry's research on nicotine, and the statements of corpo-
rate officials, that the manufacturers knew nicotine had drug-
like effects. 38 In addition, the agency found that it would be
foreseeable to a reasonable manufacturer that consumers would
use the product for its drug-like effects. 39 These facts are suffi-
cient to establish intent. 40
The same findings apply to smokeless tobacco. The evi-
dence shows that smokeless tobacco companies understood the
pharmacological effects of nicotine,41 designed their products to
deliver the optimum dose of nicotine to their customers,42 and
aimed their products at youthful users. For example, the coun-
try's largest smokeless tobacco manufacturer, U.S. Tobacco, de-
veloped a marketing strategy that started new users on brands
with relatively low levels of nicotine and progressively moved
them up to higher nicotine doses that new users could not toler-
34. Id. at § 321 (g)(1)(C).
35. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44702-02 (1996).
36. See id. at 44854.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 44692.
40. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44847 (1996).
41. See id. at 45100.
42. See id. at 45108.
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ate.43 The evidence led the FDA to assert jurisdiction over ciga-
rettes and smokeless tobacco. 44
Once it established that it had jurisdiction, the FDA had to
decide what action to take. This was a difficult issue. Even
though tobacco products are deadly, the agency had to take into
account the nearly forty million Americans already addicted to
the nicotine in tobacco products. The agency concluded that a
ban could create a black market, similar to that which resulted
from Prohibition in the 1930s. Thus, it was unclear whether a
ban would actually reduce tobacco use.45 Consequently, after
careful consideration of the issue, the agency decided that a ban
was not the best public health option.
After studying the issue, the FDA focused on two key ele-
ments: children and addiction. In the past, the debate had al-
ways been about getting adults to stop smoking. Because
nicotine is addictive, this has been only partially successful. In
terms of public health, it appeared that prevention would be a
much more effective approach.
When the agency looked at the age at which tobacco use
commonly begins, the answer was clear: childhood and adoles-
cence. Eighty-two percent of all regular smokers begin as teen-
agers and more than half are already addicted by the time they
reach adulthood.46 If an individual can avoid tobacco use during
adolescence, the chance that he or she will ever begin is very
small.
The FDA investigation also showed that the tobacco compa-
nies fully understood that it is children, not adults, who begin
using tobacco. The evidence strongly suggested that tobacco
companies used that knowledge to target teenagers in their ad-
vertising and promotional campaigns. 47
Like the evidence on jurisdiction, some of the most compel-
ling evidence came from tobacco company executives them-
selves. For example, one R.J. Reynolds official wrote in 1984
about the importance of adolescents to the survival of the indus-
try: "Young smokers have been the critical factor in the growth
43. See id. at 45120.
44. See id. at 44619.
45. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44398 (1996).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 44476.
[Vol. 18:2 7
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss1/2
1997] FDA's DECISION TO REGULATE TOBACCO 35
and decline of every major brand and company over the last 50
years."48 Another RJR official put it even more clearly in 1973,
when he said, "[r]ealistically, if our company is to survive and
prosper over the long-term, we must get our share of the youth
market." He added, "[elvidence is now available [that] indi-
cate[s] that the 14-18 year old age group is an increasing seg-
ment of the smoking population. RJR must soon establish a
successful new brand in this market if our position in the indus-
try is to be maintained over the long term."49
This industry focus on children appears to have been suc-
cessful. Some 3,000 children and adolescents begin to smoke
each day. 50 That's more than 1,000,000 new young smokers per
year. Of those 3,000 who begin to smoke, 1,000 will quit and
1,000 will get lucky; but every day 1,000 children who start
smoking will die prematurely.51 The FDA realized that if it
could reduce the number of children who start smoking by fifty
percent, it could save 500 lives per day - almost 200,000 lives
per year. This would be comparable to eliminating all deaths
from automobile accidents for four consecutive years.52
The FDA's investigation allowed it to see the roots of the
problem and to develop a strategy that could gain broad sup-
port: keep cigarettes and other tobacco products out of the
hands of children. This approach has a strong appeal that tran-
scends politics. Smokers, and even tobacco companies, agree
that children should not smoke. Every state has a law prohibit-
ing the sale of tobacco products to children.
To keep children from using tobacco products, the FDA had
to address two issues: adolescent access to tobacco products and
the appeal of these products created by annual multi-billion dol-
lar advertising budgets. The agency had to limit both the sup-
ply of tobacco to children and the demand for these products. It
would not be enough merely to limit access; if the demand
48. See id. at 44841, n. 129; O.Phelps and J. Hodges, Suit: Kids were Focus of
Reynolds Strategy, STAR TRIBUNE, July 11, 1996, at 1A.
49. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44481.
50. See id. at 44422.
51. See id. at 44399.
52. See "Motor Vehicle Occupants and Nonoccupants Killed and Injured,
1985-1995," Traffic Safety Facts 1995- Overview, U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, National Center for Sta-
tistics and Analysis, 1995.
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among adolescents remained high, they would find a way to get
tobacco products.
The access provisions in the rule are straightforward. After
the rule goes into effect, it will generally be illegal to sell ciga-
rettes except in a face-to-face transaction where the buyer dem-
onstrates that he or she is eighteen or older. That means no
vending machines (except in bars and other places not accessi-
ble to kids).53 It means no free samples. 54 It means that ciga-
rettes must be placed beyond reach - behind the counter or in
locked cabinets. 55
Regulating advertising, although more difficult, is essen-
tial. One effect of advertising is to make tobacco products so-
cially acceptable - to associate them with fun, sex and sports.
These advertisements are very effective in appealing to chil-
dren. The three most heavily advertise brands: Marlboro,
Camel and Newport, are smoked by eighty-six percent of young
smokers. 56 By contrast, thirty-nine percent of adults choose one
of the "generic" brands which are advertised less, and are less
expensive. 57
R.J. Reynolds claims that it did not intend for its "Joe
Camel" character to appeal to kids. Yet, one study found that
thirty percent of three year olds and ninety-one percent of six
year olds could identify Joe Camel as a symbol for smoking.58
During the five years following the launch of the Joe Camel
campaign, Camel's market share among minors climbed from
below four percent to between thirteen and sixteen percent,
while its market share among adults remained stagnant.59
Under the rule, most tobacco advertising will no longer con-
tain the colorful images that young people have come to associ-
ate with these products. Most tobacco ads will be restricted to a
black and white text-only format. There are a few exceptions to
this requirement, including advertisements in publications read
53. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44448 (1996).
54. See id. at 44460.
55. See id. at 44453.
56. See id. at 44482.
57. See id.
58. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41314, 41333 (1995).
59. See id.
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primarily by adults, and in places totally inaccessible to young
people. 60
Furthermore, billboards and other outdoor advertising
within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds are totally prohib-
ited.61 Tobacco companies will also no longer be permitted to
sell or distribute promotional items such as t-shirts, caps, and
sporting goods that carry the brand names and logos of tobacco
products.62 These items are so popular with children, according
to a Gallup survey, that nearly half of adolescents who smoke,
and over one quarter who do not, own at least one of them. 63
At the same time, the rule will prohibit tobacco companies
from linking sporting, racing, and other events to tobacco prod-
ucts.6 For instance, the Winston Cup auto race would no
longer be sponsored by the cigarette brand name Winston. In-
stead, it would be presented in the name of the company, R.J.
Reynolds, not in the name of a product to which adolescents are
becoming addicted.
There is one more dimension of the tobacco initiative that
the FDA announced it intended to pursue: education.65 Most
children and teenagers already know that tobacco is dangerous,
but few believe that the risks apply to them. The FDA has
stated it will initiate a process which could require tobacco com-
panies to support a televised educational campaign to educate
young people about the health risks of tobacco. 66 These types of
messages proved effective in the late 1960s when broadcasters
were required to air them to counter the cigarette advertising
then permitted on television.67
The final rule was. published in August 1996, and the first
provisions of the FDA's regulation of tobacco age and identifica-
tion requirements went into effect in February 1997. The rest
60. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44465 (1996).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 44466.
63. See id. at 44525.
64. See id. at 44466.
65. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44538 (1996).
66. The agency has considered utilizing section 518(a) of the FEDERAL FOOD,
DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT, 21 U.S.C.§ 360h (1982), if the evidentiary standard is
met, to require the cigarette and smokeless tobacco manufacturers to notify cus-
tomers and potential customers, including children, of the dangers of tobacco use.
See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44538 (1996).
67. See id.
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of the access provisions, and all of the advertising and promo-
tion provisions, were scheduled to go into effect in August 1997.
The sponsorship provisions were scheduled to become effective
in August 1998.
The cigarette and smokeless tobacco industries, advertising
trade groups, and convenience store operators immediately filed
a lawsuit against the FDA in U.S. District Court in Greensboro,
North Carolina, challenging the validity of the FDA's regula-
tion 68 . They sought summary judgment, claiming as a matter of
law that: (1) Congress had withheld from the FDA the authority
to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco; (2) the Act does
not authorize the FDA to regulate these products as drugs and
delivery devices; and (3) the restrictions imposed by the FDA on
advertising violate the First Amendment 69.
On April 25, 1997, Judge Osteen ruled that the FDA had
jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as
drug delivery systems under the combination product and re-
stricted device provisions of the Act.70 He declined to rule on
the plaintiffs constitutional claim, finding instead that the ad-
vertising provisions were invalid on statutory grounds 71. The
tobacco companies and advertisers have appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Oral Argument was
held on August 11, 1997.
Two months after Judge Osteen's decision, the tobacco in-
dustry entered into a tentative settlement with a number of
states' Attorneys General to resolve lawsuits that the states had
brought against the tobacco companies, seeking reimbursement
for expenses incurred under the federal Medicaid program. The
settlement would provide, by legislation, consent agreements,
and contracts, that: the tobacco industry submit to modified
FDA jurisdiction; agree to be bound by the FDA's access and
advertising restrictions; and pay $368.5 billion over 25 years to
states, injured plaintiffs, federal programs, including $500 mil-
lion per year for public education about the hazards of tobacco.
Opinions vary on the sufficiency and wisdom of the settlement,
but only three and a half years ago, when Commissioner Kess-
68. See Coyne Beahm v. FDA, 966 F.Supp 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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ler sent his letter responding to a citizen's petition, it was
unimaginable that this country would have made so much pro-
gress in adopting meaningful steps to reduce tobacco use.
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